Controlling Corruption Through Collective Action

Issue Date January 2013
Volume 24
Issue 1
Page Numbers 101-115
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Control of corruption in a society is an equilibrium between resources and costs which either empowers or constraints elites predatory behavior. While most research and practice focuses on legal constraints, this paper investigates normative constraints, deemed to be more important, especially civil society and the press. Fresh evidence—both historical and statistical—is found to support Tocqueville’s assertions regarding the importance of collective action and the joint action of media and associations in not only creating a democratic society, but controlling corruption as well. However, little is known on how to build normative constraints.

About the Author

Alina Mungiu-Pippidi is professor of democratization and policy analysis at the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin. Her latest book, The Quest for Good Governance: How Societies Develop Control of Corruption, has just been published by Cambridge University Press.

View all work by Alina Mungiu-Pippidi