

Table—Types of Coups in Democracies, 1958–2014

Year	Country	Coup Category
2014	Thailand	Non-Promissory: No reference to future regime
2012	Mali	Promissory
2012	Guinea-Bissau	Promissory
2009	Honduras	Promissory
2006	Madagascar	Promissory
2006	Thailand	Promissory
2006	Fiji	Promissory
2000	Fiji	Non-Promissory: No reference to future regime
1999	Pakistan	Promissory
1996	Niger	Promissory
1994	Gambia	Promissory
1994	Lesotho	Promissory
1991	Haiti	Promissory
1989	Sudan	Non-Promissory: Revolutionary army rule
1987	Fiji	Promissory
1983	Nigeria	Non-Promissory: No reference to future regime
1981	Ghana	Non-Promissory: Revolutionary army rule
1980	Turkey	Promissory
1977	Pakistan	Promissory
1976	Argentina	Non-Promissory: No reference to future regime
1974	Cyprus	Promissory
1973	Chile	Non-Promissory:

*Nancy Bermeo, “On Democratic Backsliding,” *Journal of Democracy* 27 (January 2016): 5–19.

		No reference to future regime
1971	Turkey	Promissory
1969	Somalia	Non-Promissory: Revolutionary army rule
1969	Sudan	Non-Promissory: Revolutionary army rule
1967	Sierra Leone	Non-Promissory: No reference to future regime
1966	Nigeria	Non-Promissory: Revolutionary army rule
1966	Uganda	Non-Promissory: No reference to future regime
1963	Dominican Republic	Non-Promissory: No reference to future regime
1962	Burma	Non-Promissory: Revolutionary army rule
1961	South Korea	Promissory
1960	Laos	Non-Promissory: No reference to future regime
1958	Sudan	Non-Promissory: No reference to future regime
1958	Pakistan	Promissory
1958	Burma	Promissory

Overview:


This list compiles all coups d'état occurring in democratic countries during the period 1946–2014. Democracy is defined as having a Polity IV score of +6 or higher. Each coup is in addition classified as “promissory” or “non-promissory,” according to whether in the formal statement following the seizure of authority the coup makers promised elections and an eventual return to democracy. The category of non-promissory coups is further subdivided depending on the future regime plans of the coup makers. When the formal takeover statement dwells exclusively on the reasons for the coup or on law and order issues without mentioning a timeframe for a future regime change, the coup was categorized as making “no reference to future regime.” In cases where the takeover statement refers to a political project by the military to undertake a revolutionary restructuring of society, the coup is coded as legitimized by “revolutionary army rule.” No other pattern of non-promissory coup justifications was found in the collected takeover statements—the categorization is exhaustive and mutually exclusive.

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The list of coups was compiled mainly from the dataset “Coups d’état events, 1946–2014” by Monty and Donna Marshall from the Centre for Systemic Peace (2015). The main dataset was complemented by Gleditsch’s extension of the Polity IV data (2013) and by Powell and Thyne’s original data on coups (2011). Regarding the collection of coup makers’ takeover statements, the sources used were varied, including Keesing’s Record of World Events and electronic archives of various newspapers and media broadcasters such as the *New York Times*, the BBC, *Le Monde*, *The Telegraph*, *The Independent*, *Los Angeles Times* and *The Economist*. Various books and articles were also consulted.

Empirical Patterns:

The tone set by coup makers in their formal takeover statements changed drastically with the end of the Cold War. While before 1989 only 33 percent (7 out of 21) of coup statements promised a return to democracy, after 1989 fully 85 percent of them did (11 out of 13). Figure 1 displays graphically the percentage of promissory and non-promissory coups in the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. Regarding the justification of non-promissory coups, before 1989 43 percent of the subset of non-promissory coups (6 out of 14) proclaimed a period of revolutionary army rule, while after 1989 none of the two coups which did not promise a return to democracy were of the revolutionary variety.



*Nancy Bermeo, “On Democratic Backsliding,” *Journal of Democracy* 27 (January 2016): 5–19.