The year 2005 may prove to have been one of the most politically consequential in the modern history of Iraq. In the space of less than eleven months, the country held three elections. The elections took place successfully, with Iraqis voting in large numbers despite widespread logistical challenges, terrorist intimidation, and insurgent violence. But in their entrenchment of ethnic and sectarian fissures as the main organizing principle of politics, the three votes highlighted the role and limits of electoral-system design in the quest to manage and contain potentially polarizing divisions.
About the Authors
Larry Diamond
Larry Diamond is senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University, and founding coeditor of the Journal of Democracy.
Adeed Dawisha is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Miami University in Oxford, Ohio. His latest book is Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation (2009).
Political scientists have long theorized that the use of “preferential” election systems can help promote successful conflict management in divided societies. As it turns out, evidence from five real-world cases…
