The Man Who Would Oust a Dynasty

A few years ago Anura Kumara Dissanayake led a struggling political party with bleak prospects. Now he is Sri Lanka’s newly elected president. The hardest work may still lie ahead.

By Marlon Ariyasinghe

In the early hours of Sunday, September 22, as I sat confined in an airplane in transit, Sri Lanka was navigating a transition of its own. The results of the first set of mail-in ballots from Sri Lanka’s hotly contested presidential election had just been announced, and my flight to San Francisco from Colombo Bandaranaike International Airport was about to depart. The frontrunner, Anura Kumara Dissanayake of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and the National People’s Power alliance (NPP), was cruising through the early tally with comfortable margins. At the same time, several key political figures chose to leave the country, including former finance minister Basil Rajapaksa, the brother of ousted ex-president Gotabaya Rajapaksa. His departure was notable, given that his nephew Namal Rajapaksa, the son of ex-president Mahinda Rajapaksa, was competing in the elections on behalf of the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (Sri Lanka People’s Front or SLPP).

The Rajapaksas had created a nepotistic political dynasty since Mahinda came to power in 2005. But in the 2024 presidential election, the future of that dynasty was hanging in the balance. Alongside Dissanayake, two other key figures in this political race — incumbent president Ranil Wickremesinghe and opposition leader Sajith Premadasa of the Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB) — were also vying for their futures. But this wasn’t just a contest for political heirs, presidential hopefuls, or incumbents. It was a test of the very direction the country would take.

Just hours earlier, I had fulfilled my civic duty along with more than seventeen-million eligible Sri Lankan voters. The faint purple mark of ink on my left pinky finger, applied to prevent voter fraud, served as a quiet reminder. As I reflected on the unfolding results, jotting down my thoughts mid-flight while frantically tweeting, what would ordinarily have been a long, draining twenty-hour journey transformed into an invigorating experience. Even above the clouds at 33,000 feet, I remained connected to my people through the drama of an election day that went into an unprecedented second round, which finally saw the left-leaning Anura Kumara Dissanayake elected as Sri Lanka’s ninth president.

From 3 Percent to 42 Percent

In a now-viral Facebook post from the 2015 presidential election, Dissanayake famously declared, “They tried to bury us. They didn’t know we were seeds.” During that election, the JVP and the NPP alliance chose not to field a candidate of their own. While they avoided officially backing any contender, they made it clear they sought the defeat of Mahinda Rajapaksa. Though not formalized, their support leaned toward Maithripala Sirisena, who spearheaded his presidential bid by leading a collection of opposition parties and civic groups. After his election victory, Sirisena formed a coalition government with Ranil Wickremesinghe, which ultimately failed.

This political misstep prompted a shift in the NPP’s strategy. Perhaps more clearly than ever, they recognized that aligning themselves with leaders from the two dominant parties was no longer a viable path. It was time to forge their own distinct course in Sri Lankan politics. However, the JVP’s violent past, marked by two failed insurrections in 1971 and 1987–89, continued to haunt them. As a young school boy, Dissanayake himself had taken part in the 1987–89 JVP rebellion. The two major political parties often invoked the horrors of the 1987–89 Bheeshanaya (“The Terror”) — a period that saw between 60,000 and 100,000 deaths — to dissuade voters, particularly older generations, from supporting the JVP. In response, the JVP formed the broader NPP alliance, aiming to distance itself from its violent history and offset the stigma from its past. Over time, the NPP also deepened its engagements with policy experts and Sri Lankan expatriates, incorporating their insights into the party platform. These connections proved valuable, as they contributed to the development of a comprehensive party manifesto and helped the NPP to communicate to the global diaspora as the 2024 elections drew nearer.

In the 2019 presidential election, the NPP fielded Dissanayake, who placed third with more than 400,000 votes, accounting for 3.2 percent of the vote. Though largely symbolic, Dissanayake’s candidacy sent a strong signal to the political landscape: The NPP had firmly distanced itself from the two dominant political factions that had long controlled Sri Lanka. Since then, the party’s messaging has remained consistent — the country has been ruined by the entrenched political elites, who are corrupt, incompetent, and unfit to govern.

The 2020 parliamentary elections, however, proved challenging. Despite their efforts, the NPP managed to secure only 3.8 percent of the vote, earning just three seats in parliament. Branded as the “3 percent party,” the NPP’s future appeared uncertain, with prospects for its rise as a major political force even bleaker. While their speeches resonated with voters, these same voters remained hesitant to vote NPP.

However, no one could have foreseen the tumult Sri Lanka would endure in the past four years. The covid-19 pandemic devastated an economy heavily dependent on foreign revenue from tourism and migrant remittances. This crisis was compounded by a series of disastrous decisions by President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, including an overnight ban on chemical fertilizers and the artificial capping of the rupee-to-dollar exchange rate. By the end of 2021, Sri Lanka was spiraling into an economic catastrophe. Queues for gas and milk powder began to form, and by early 2022 the country faced extended power outages and long lines for fuel. Sri Lanka was plunged into the worst economic crisis in its history.

Widespread disillusionment sparked mass protests, known as the Janatha Aragalaya (“People’s Struggle”), demanding President Rajapaksa’s resignation. The NPP, however, could not fully capitalize on this movement at the time, principally because of its organic, unpredictable nature. Yet there is no doubt that the NPP benefited greatly from the political consciousness and demand for systemic change that emerged in its wake.

Protesters also called for Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe’s resignation. But the prime minister rallied the support of Rajapaksa-aligned MPs after Gotabaya fled the country, and by late July 2022, Wickremesinghe was appointed president by the parliament. Dissanayake and the NPP consistently invoked ideals of the protests in their rallies, highlighting the entrenched corruption of the political establishment. They pointed to the unlikely Wickremesinghe-Rajapaksa alliance as proof of how political elites would cast aside old rivalries for the sake of power, which resonated with the voter base.

From 2022 to 2024, Wickremesinghe’s economic policy centered on debt restructuring, securing international support, and implementing IMF-backed austerity measures. These policies, however, came at a high cost — strict import controls and austerity cut deep into the livelihoods of the country’s most vulnerable populations. According to a recent report, 54 percent of households in Sri Lanka experienced food insecurity. During their campaign, this economic hardship became a consistent talking point for Dissanayake and the NPP.

A week before the election, during a live televised debate, Dissanayake reflected on his political journey, stating, “We weren’t even in a position to dream of holding political power — we were far beneath that. Honestly, I believed I would go down as someone who fought but never prevailed. Yet here we are today, standing at the threshold of turning that dream into a reality.”

These words captured the essence of a decade-long struggle, as the seeds sown in 2015 finally bore fruit, with Dissanayake reaping the rewards of that effort on 22 September 2024.

No Magic, Just Juggling

Within the first 48 hours of Dissanayake’s presidency, he appointed a three-member cabinet of NPP MPs, with Harini Amarasuriya as prime minister, a move that has been widely welcomed. While Sri Lanka previously made history by appointing the world’s first female prime minister, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, in 1960, followed by Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga in 1994, Amarasuriya stands out as the country’s first female prime minister to rise to the position without relying on a traditional political dynasty. Further, Dissanayake has dissolved the parliament and called for snap elections scheduled for November 14. Dissanayake and NPP are expected to carry their momentum into the general elections.

Dissanayake’s greatest challenge as Sri Lanka’s ninth president will be to unite a deeply divided nation. In the Sri Lankan voting system, voters are allowed to cast three preferential votes. If no candidate secures 50 percent of the total votes, a second round of counting takes place between the top two candidates. Dissanayake was unable to achieve the required 50 percent majority, and won the election only on the second count. More than 6.5 million people voted for Premadasa and Wickremesinghe. How Dissanayake reconciles them with his own political project remains to be seen. Further, the results indicate that the bulk of Dissanayake’s votes in the south came from those who previously voted for Rajapaksas. These constituencies are shaped by an ingrained sense of Sinhala-Buddhist exceptionalism. The question now is how Dissanayake and the NPP can forge a path that doesn’t alienate these groups while attempting to break free from the Sinhala-Buddhist ethnonationalist politics that have long shaped the country’s political trajectory.

Meanwhile, the Tamil political landscape remains fractured even though some Tamil parties made a decisive statement in these elections by rallying behind a common candidate. This was a symbolic resistance against the rule of Sinhala leaders who often sidelined the north and east’s demands for political autonomy. Even before the results, the NPP’s presence in the north and east was sorely lacking, hampered by both historical divides and language barriers. How Dissanayake plans to bridge these gaps remains a key question. Will his government truly address the call for devolution, a longstanding demand in the Tamil-majority areas, or will the NPP’s history of ethnonationalism and resistance from the south impede progress?

In order for the NPP to move forward, it will need to perform well in the general elections. While the momentum from the presidential election has historically carried over to parliamentary elections, the 2024 three-horse presidential race may have a different effect on the general elections. While a multiparty government without a clear majority might suggest a step toward a more progressive democracy, it could significantly hinder the NPP’s ambitions for systemic reform.

The promise to abolish the executive presidency presents another major question. Over the past three decades, numerous advocates and political figures have pushed for the abolition of Sri Lanka’s executive presidency due to its excessive concentration of power. Presidents have promised abolition during their candidacy, but none, except for Sirisena, who reduced some of its powers, could act on their promise. On the day Dissanayake was sworn in, NPP member Sunil Handunnetti proclaimed that Sri Lanka had just appointed its final executive president, suggesting that a government under the NPP and Dissanayake would at last fulfill the longstanding promise to abolish the executive presidency. But whether Dissanayake and the NPP will follow through remains uncertain. To consolidate power, especially after such a hard-fought election, Dissanayake may feel the need to retain the office. The harsh reality of governance and the challenges ahead could force the new president to reassess the bold promise of abolition.

Managing expectations will be an enormous challenge. Both Sirisena and Rajapaksa, the last two elected presidents, lost public favor within their first year in office. In today’s era of social media, it’s easier than ever to spread disinformation, stir ridicule, and sway public opinion. Gotabaya Rajapaksa, for example, was unable to escape the “Sir Fail” label, a nickname that dogged his entire presidency and cemented his image as a failure. While there is jubilation now, that euphoria will soon fade. Sri Lanka remains in the grip of a deep economic crisis, and the NPP’s hands will be tied by IMF demands, limiting room for drastic reforms. As he took his presidential oath, Dissanayake declared: “I am not a magician.” He may not be a magician, but he will have to be a juggler, balancing his campaign promises, the dire economic situation, the IMF deal, the aspirations of the voters, calls to mitigate corruption, enlisting the support of the north and the east, and other challenges.

The golden question is: Can Dissanayake and NPP hold on? Sri Lankan politics has a way of consuming its leaders, with the seat of the presidency often referred to as a curse. The weight of expectations, the immense pressure of dissent, and the struggles to deliver could easily erode his early momentum. The executive presidency is akin to the precious ring from The Lord of the Rings — once in power, the temptation to hold onto it, despite its heavy burden, can be overwhelming. Can Dissanayake resist the taint of the office and work toward its abolition, or will the allure of power ultimately consume him like it has so many before?

Marlon Ariyasinghe is a PhD student in Performance Studies at Stanford University. He was the former Senior Assistant Editor at Himal Southasian. He tweets at @exfrotezter.

Copyright © 2024 National Endowment for Democracy

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