What Happened to South Korea’s Democracy?

The quick reversal of President Yoon’s martial-law order is being celebrated as a democratic victory. But the problems run deeper than one man. What comes next? 

By Gi-Wook Shin

December 2024

On December 3, I woke up to breaking news on my phone: “Martial law in South Korea.” Initially, I thought it was fake. How could this possibly happen in my home country in 2024? At the same time, I could not escape the painful memories of the last two periods when martial law was imposed, in 1979 and 1980, when I was a college student. Still, I believe that, despite recent democratic backsliding, South Korea has strong democratic institutions to withstand this latest undemocratic and unconstitutional challenge. Whereas in the past martial law led to prolonged autocracy, this time it was lifted within six hours of President Yoon Suk Yeol’s declaration. Political turmoil and uncertainties will, however, continue for the foreseeable future.

What has happened to this exemplary case of Asian democracy, and why now? What does this incident reveal about Korean democracy and its future? What lessons can we — Koreans, Americans, and others around the world — learn from this experience?

What Happened?

There are multiple factors at play, but we can divide them into two main forces: one related to larger sociopolitical dynamics and the other to President Yoon and his leadership.

Democratic Backsliding

Like many other democratic nations around the world, Korea has witnessed “democratic decay” in recent years. In my July 2020 Journal of Democracy essay, I warned that Korea was following global trends, sliding toward a “democratic depression,” as both the spirit of democracy and actual liberal-democratic standards were under attack. I explained how opponents were being demonized and democratic norms eroded, as political life grew ever more polarized.

What made the Korean case unique at the time was that, unlike other countries where far-right elements were playing on populist sentiments, illiberal measures in Korea were the work of a leftist Democratic Party government led by former prodemocracy activists who had become a new power elite. Although they lost the presidency to Yoon Suk Yeol of the conservative People Power Party (PPP) in 2022 by a razor-thin margin of less than 1 percent, Korea’s democratic backsliding did not stop.

Powerful forces of illiberalism, populism, and polarization have continued to shape the country’s political landscape. Tensions between the executive and legislative branches have visibly intensified, especially as the opposition-controlled (with 192 of 300 seats) National Assembly kept passing bills that the president then vetoed.

Yoon’s Leadership Style

As a career prosecutor, Yoon gained popularity as a man of integrity, unrelenting in his efforts to root out corruption and unyielding to political pressures. It was this reputation that propelled him to the presidency. He entered politics, however, with little preparation or experience, and continued to act more like a prosecutor than a president, failing to demonstrate the kind of political leadership the role requires.

While building a firm foundation on the rule of law, a president must also make a conscientious effort to reflect on and staunchly defend democratic norms, such as tolerance for the opposition and forbearance in exercising power. In a pluralistic, democratic society, the highest-elected leader cannot act like a prosecutor and simply cut the Gordian knot without consequences when faced with resistance.

In a country like Korea, where there is strong resistance from an opposition party with a supermajority in parliament and a dense network of progressive civil society organizations, governance requires deft political leadership. A president must carefully consider the full range of public opinion on major issues, lead political negotiations, mediate and make compromises among different views, and exercise restraint in wielding power. Unfortunately, these are not Yoon’s strengths.

Yoon became very frustrated with the political process and resentful of the opposition for passing bills that he would naturally veto, for example mandating a special counselor to investigate his wife’s alleged crimes, including the “Dior Bag Scandal” and accusations of stock-price manipulation. Yoon’s ratings had plunged even before the martial-law decree (to around just 20 percent), and there is a serious division within his own party. It seems that nothing has been going well for the embattled president — national economic woes, criminal accusations against his wife, the lack of unity within the PPP, to name just three of Yoon’s many troubles.

One might say that he declared martial law to send a strong warning to the opposition, but if so, it was a terrible mistake that will only hasten the demise of his political career. Yoon’s belief that he could run the country under martial law reveals how out of touch he is. It is 2024, not 1980. By suspending civilian rule, Yoon effectively committed political suicide.

What Now?

Yoon’s badly miscalculated, undemocratic maneuver has failed — under pressure from lawmakers and the public, he lifted martial law just hours after declaring it — and now he must face the consequences. He had issued the decree on grounds of eliminating “anti-state forces” that were supposedly rebelling and supporting North Korea. Yet doing so violated the constitution and procedural laws.

Because martial law suspends the basic freedoms that safeguard democracy — including the warrant requirement for raids and arrests, the freedoms of speech, publication, assembly, and association, and the authority of the courts — Korea’s constitution clearly states that martial law can be declared only “when it is necessary to respond to military needs or maintain public order in wartime or a similar national emergency.” Korea’s current situation does not meet these criteria. Yoon may now face criminal charges for violating the constitution. It is ironic that he was the main prosecutor who convicted two former conservative presidents, Lee Myung Bak and Park Geun Hye, and sent them both to prison.

Yoon has now lost the trust, legitimacy, and mandate necessary to lead the country, even among his own constituents. Calls for his resignation are growing, public protests are intensifying, and his already dismal approval rating will continue to descend.

Impeaching the president requires two-thirds of the Assembly (200 of 300) votes, which means that eight members from the ruling party must support the opposition’s motion to impeach. If it passes the Assembly, the motion will go to the Constitutional Court for a final verdict. Until a ruling is handed down, Yoon’s presidency will be suspended, and the prime minister will serve as acting president. If Yoon is impeached, a snap election must be held within two months.

I doubt that Yoon will resign voluntarily, but I’m also not sure how he can continue to govern the country. He just finished half of his five-year term. While PPP leader Han Dong-hoon, Yoon’s former political protégé, has called for the president to step down immediately, citing the “significant risks” he poses to the nation, the impeachment also creates a serious dilemma for the ruling party, which remains traumatized by the 2017 impeachment and removal of former president Park Geun Hye. Conservative leaders lost the subsequent snap elections and endured a brutal campaign of political retribution to “eradicate deep-rooted evils,” led by the administration of Park’s liberal successor, Moon Jae In.

The same thing could happen again now, especially given the likelihood that opposition leader Lee Jae Myung, Yoon’s Democratic Party opponent in the 2022 election, could win the presidency. Lee, however, is facing trial on multiple criminal charges, including bribery and corruption. He has already been sentenced to a year in prison with two years of probation for violating election laws by making false public statements on the campaign trail. This alternative to Yoon does not appear as promising for Korean democracy as one would hope.

Future and Lessons

What does this episode tell us about the state of Korean politics, particularly Korean democracy? Should we be depressed that it happened, or hopeful because it failed?

Yoon’s doomed power grab highlights both the vulnerabilities and the resilience of Korean democracy. While it exposed serious problems such as polarization, executive overreach, and weakened public trust, the National Assembly’s swift rejection of martial law and the massive public outcry demonstrated strong institutional checks, civic engagement, and the opportunity to reinforce democratic safeguards.

This episode is also a stern warning to the world: People should take democratic backsliding in their countries seriously. If such an event can happen in Korea — an advanced nation long regarded as an exemplary case of the “third wave” of democratization — then it can happen anywhere that is experiencing similar democratic challenges. This is a critical lesson for democracies worldwide.

Gi-Wook Shin is William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea and director of the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, both at Stanford University, and coeditor of South Korea’s Democracy in Crisis: The Threats of Illiberalism, Populism, and Polarization (2022). 

Copyright © 2024 National Endowment for Democracy

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