![Right-wing protest against the German government's Ukraine policy.](https://journalofdemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/AfD-rally.jpg)
The far-right Alternative for Germany is no longer a protest party. It’s tapping into widespread discontent and is surprisingly popular with young voters. Even more, it is reshaping the political future of Germany.
September 2024
Regional elections in eastern Germany rarely make global headlines. However, state elections in Thuringia and Saxony on September 1 proved the exception. The reason: the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the newly founded left-wing populist Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) emerged as the biggest winners, marking the first time the German far right has received a majority in the postwar era and indicating drastic shifts in Germany’s party system.
Given the historical significance — after all, Thuringia is where the National Socialists first gained political influence in the 1930s — international reporting was predictably infused with historical foreboding, warning of the potential collapse of German democracy. In truth, with a combined population of around six million, the immediate impact of these elections on national politics is likely to be limited. Still, the results could be a harbinger. With these state-election campaigns focusing on issues of national and even global relevance — such as immigration, the war in Ukraine, and the cost of living — voters sent a strong message of discontent, with German media calling the result a “tsunami of anger” directed at Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s coalition of Social Democrats, Free Democrats, and Greens.
In Thuringia, the AfD emerged as the strongest party, surpassing the conservative Christian Democrats with 32.8 percent of the vote, and pushing the Liberals and Greens out of the state parliament (Landtag). The newly established BSW came in third with 15.8 percent of the vote — an unprecedented success for a party founded only in January. Support for Die Linke — the strongest party just five years ago — more than halved, costing it its only remaining state premiership. The results from Saxony were equally disruptive for established parties. Although the conservative Christian Democrats narrowly emerged ahead of the AfD, the far right still achieved unprecedented success, gaining 30.6 percent of the vote. Once again, the newly founded BSW secured a strong third place with 11.8 percent. While the Greens narrowly cleared the 5 percent threshold to gain representation in the Landtag, the Linke will remain in parliament in spite of falling below it. Two of its candidates won direct seats, which entitles the party to proportional representation. Germany’s oldest party, Scholz’s Social Democrats, stayed on the margins and only narrowly overcame the 5 percent threshold.
Exit polling showed that voters’ were motivated by widespread discontent with the ruling coalition in Berlin that went beyond a single issue. In Saxony, one-fifth of voters cited social security as the decisive factor in their voting decision, closely followed by immigration at 19 percent. In Thuringia, crime (21 percent) topped the list of decisive issues, just ahead of social security (21 percent) and immigration (18 percent). These national political issues — immigration, internal security, and the conflict in Ukraine — are where the AfD and BSW capitalized most on voter discontent.
The days in which German protest parties were fueled by objection to a single issue, from the eurocrisis to immigration, seem to be gone. Today’s dissatisfaction is multifaceted and widespread. Notably, voter participation reached a record high, countering the notion that results were driven by radicalized minorities.
Coalition building in Saxony and Thuringia will not come easy. All established parties have firmly closed the door on partnering with the AfD. Although AfD lead candidate Björn Höcke has a claim to Thuringia’s premiership, and has announced that he would invite parties for coalition talks, it is clear that no one will agree even to talk about such talks. The Brandmauer (firewall) against collaborating with the far right seems to be holding for now and is backed by majorities in Thuringia and Saxony.
For the Christian Democrats, the Brandmauer is not the only political line in the sand. The party has long taken a formal vow not to cooperate with the former communist Die Linke. Thus, in Thuringia, a likely governing scenario may involve a minority coalition government of the centrist Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, and BSW silently backed by the Linke. In Saxony, coalition building appears slightly less challenging for the established parties; the governing Christian Democratic premier, Michael Kretschmer, may remain in office thanks to a coalition of Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, and the BSW.
The Signs Ahead
With elections in Brandenburg just weeks away and the next federal elections in a year, these state contests point to trends that are likely to shape the future of German politics.
The AfD is no longer a mere protest party. Gaining a third of the vote, the party’s popularity has largely proven immune to a wave of anti–far-right protests earlier this year, political scandals, and its formal labeling as right-wing extremist by German authorities. According to exit polls, more than half of voters now support the AfD strictly for ideological reasons, particularly due to the party’s perceived stance on issues such as immigration, crime, and social justice.
One trend is especially noteworthy. While the German public debate often portrays the far right as a voice of the past (with good reason given AfD comments downplaying Germany’s Nazi history) and hence as representing disgruntled older voters, the reality appears quite different. Exit polls indicate that the AfD emerged as the strongest party among voters aged 18 to 24, with younger voters less inclined to perceive the party as politically extreme.
This normalization and growing support from the younger generation challenges the notion that the AfD’s appeal is limited to an aging, reactionary base, signaling a potentially lasting shift in the political landscape.
The second emerging trend is the notable success of Sahra Wagenknecht’s newly founded BSW. The party is a political anomaly not only for carrying the name of its founder, the outspoken former Linke leader, but also for its idiosyncratic mix of left-wing economics, a critical stance on open borders, and a dose of anti-Americanism. Celebrating her party’s success and building on the momentum from the European elections earlier this year, Wagenknecht pointed to the “enormous gap of representation” in the existing party system that her movement has come to fill.
Contrary to expectations, the establishment of the BSW did not noticeably weaken the AfD. “Quite the opposite”: Most supporters of the new party come from former nonvoters, the far left, or the Social Democrats. But for the BSW, quick success comes with its own challenges. It has now emerged as a kingmaker in two regional states and is still in the process of consolidating party structures nationwide. The question is whether a quick acceptance of political responsibility on the regional level will help or hinder its national ambitions as a force for fundamental change.
Another important player with national ambitions that was strengthened by this vote was the national leader of the Christian Democrats, Friedrich Merz. His party is likely to emerge with two state premierships, bolstering Merz’s claim not only to stay at the helm of the party but positioning him well to challenge Scholz for the chancellery in next year’s elections. If his party performs well in the upcoming regional vote in Brandenburg, his candidacy seems all but secure.
Scholz, on the other hand, appears to be in an even more politically precarious position. His “traffic-light” coalition of Social Democrats, Greens, and Free Democrats were battered by the vote. Together, they received less than half of what the AfD alone garnered in voter support. The Free Democrats have been reduced to a splinter party in East Germany, calling into question their existence on the national level, while the Greens barely cleared the 5 percent threshold in Saxony.
With the Free Democrats and Greens in tatters — and the Social Democrats barely inching across the threshold for parliamentary representation — calling the mood in Berlin “sober” is an understatement. At this point, the only force holding the Berlin traffic-light coalition together is the fear of what might follow its collapse.
Michael Bröning is a political scientist and a member of the basic-value commission of the German Social Democratic Party.
Copyright © 2024 National Endowment for Democracy
Image credit: Image credit: Matthias Berg via Flickr