Why Slovakia Is Rising Up in Protest

The people have taken to the streets to demonstrate against corruption and Prime Minister Robert Fico’s pro-Moscow policies. Once again, Slovaks see their future in Europe, not Russia.

By John Chin

January 2025

Slovakia is witnessing its most significant mass protests in years. Last Friday, some 100,000 people across thirty cities — including up to 60,000 in the capital of Bratislava alone — joined mass protests against the government of Prime Minister Robert Fico. Rallying under the slogan “Slovakia is Europe,” the protesters denounced the alleged corruption, weakening democratic values, and pro-Moscow policies of the ruling Smer-SD (Direction–Social Democracy) party.

The dominant force in Slovak politics from 2006 to 2020, Smer-SD returned to power after winning the 2023 parliamentary elections, bringing with it increasingly Russia-friendly stances: from ending military aid to Ukraine to campaigning against EU sanctions on Russia to having its leaders appear on Russian television. Pro-European civil resistance has gained momentum since December following Fico’s surprise trip to Moscow to meet with Vladimir Putin.

Opposition leader Michal Šimečka of the pro-European Progressive Slovakia (PS) party accuses Smer-SD of plotting to take Slovakia out of the EU. Last Tuesday, the PS-led opposition in parliament tried to organize a no-confidence vote on Fico’s government, but walked out after the speaker agreed to Fico’s request to conduct the proceedings behind closed doors. The parliamentary showdown signals Fico’s growing vulnerability as his ruling coalition shows signs of fracturing.

Fico tried to delegitimize the demonstrations as part of a “Maidan”-style coup plot, alleging that foreign-backed Slovak activists involved in Ukraine’s 2013–14 revolution and recent protests in Georgia had now set their sights on his government. (Like Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, Fico has accused political rivals of being “Soros-paid puppets.”) A few counterdemonstrations backing Smer-SD under the slogan “Slovakia is not Ukraine” cropped up, but gained minimal support.

To understand the unrest and how it might impact Slovakia’s standing in Europe, we must go back to the country’s history of contentious politics and ongoing challenges from Russia.

Highs and Lows

Slovakia has experienced three decades of democracy since the fall of communism and its Velvet Divorce in 1992, when Czechoslovakia peacefully split into two independent Slovak and Czech republics. The quality of Slovak democracy has fluctuated over time: Slovakia was classified as an “illiberal democracy” or “competitive authoritarian” regime between 1993 and 1998 under Vladimír Mečiar’s nationalist-populist Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS). During this period, constraints on the executive weakened, but electoral participation and contestation remained robust and human rights were generally protected. The prospect of EU membership gave the West leverage, curbed Mečiar’s autocratic impulses, and drove democratization.

The opposition successfully defeated HZDS in the 1998 parliamentary contest, pioneering an electoral model of regime change in the postcommunist world: Slovaks set a precedent for democratically mobilizing to promote free and fair elections and — if incumbents tried to rig or steal the vote — staging mass protests or “color revolutions.” The opposition framed Mečiar’s personalist, populist rule as an obstacle to Slovakia’s path to EU membership, and it was backed by a mass civil society campaign of more than a hundred NGOs (together known as the Civic Campaign, or OK ’98) that mobilized voter turnout and election monitoring. Slovakia became a liberal democracy in 1998 and joined the EU and NATO in 2004, the Schengen zone in 2007, and adopted the euro in 2009.

Fico started as a social democrat and a Europeanist; his conversion to a populist nationalist was gradual and opportunistic, paralleling trends in Poland’s Law and Justice party and Hungary’s Fidesz in the 2010s. As Slovak youth shifted to the right amid Europe’s refugee crisis, Fico adopted anti-immigration rhetoric, which helped him win reelection in 2016. He was forced to resign just two years later, when the murder of investigative journalist Ján Kuciak triggered outrage, anticorruption protests, and a civil society–led movement to “make Slovakia decent again.” Fico’s unwilling departure temporarily empowered more centrist, pro-EU forces.

Slovak democracy has had its ups and downs, but data from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project show appreciable democratic backsliding only since 2023, after Fico’s return to power and increasing antiestablishment policies. Though hailing from the left, he has cultivated the support of older and socially conservative provincial voters. His “Slovakia first” agenda, vengeful politicking, and “cultural repression” have alienated progressives and more-affluent voters. Fico survived an assassination attempt last May. Weeks later, the center-left PS edged out Smer-SD in European Parliament elections. PS continues to poll ahead of Smer-SD, reflecting declining levels of public trust in Fico.

Sharp Power in Slovakia

The tug-of-war between nationalism and Europeanism in Slovakia is closely linked with the influence of Moscow and Brussels. In the mid-1990s, Mečiar tried to strengthen ties with Russia, but he could not fundamentally change Slovakia’s growing dependence on Europe. Russia had preponderant influence over Slovakia’s security at independence, but its influence has declined continuously over the decades while that of the United States has increased dramatically in recent years, per the FBIC index. Meanwhile, Russian and Chinese economic influence in Slovakia continues to be dwarfed by the country’s Western European trade partners, led by Germany and Czechia. After decades of European integration, Slovakia’s future remains inextricably tied to Europe.

Yet Russian sharp power — irregular influence operations that seek to pierce the political and information environment in target states — seeks to undermine democratic resolve in Slovakia. According to the latest Vulnerability Index, although Slovakia still has a vibrant civil society, public attitudes are particularly susceptible to malign foreign influence. Russian disinformation has fed nationalist fears: According to Globsec Trends 2024, over 40 percent of Slovaks “feel their values and identity are threatened by liberal democracy, Western societies, or Ukrainian refugees.” Though 70 percent of Slovaks support the EU and NATO, and 80 percent say they prefer democracy to other systems of government, a troubling 36 percent of respondents think strongman rule without elections could be beneficial.

Russia has actively supported fringe political forces in Slovakia — such as the far-right, pro-Russian People’s Party–Our Slovakia (ĽSNS), which held seats in parliament from 2016 to 2023 — as part of its strategy to undermine Euro-Atlantic unity. Moscow even meddled in Slovakia’s presidential elections last year, helping propel the pro-Russian Peter Pellegrini to victory as Slovakia’s president over pro-Western candidate Ivan Korčok.

Slovak Nationalism versus Europeanism

The nationalist-Europeanist divide that polarized Slovak politics in the 1990s appears to be back, with Robert Fico reprising Vladimír Mečiar’s role as a polarizing nationalist-populist incumbent. This week Fico — who defiantly rejected calls for his resignation — proposed amendments to the country’s constitution to reassert the primacy of national law over EU law and limit LGBT rights.

Will 2025 be another 1998 or 2018, when mass democratic mobilizations forced divisive populists out of power? Fico has already lost his parliamentary majority, weakening his standing. And he has not ruled out early snap elections, which could be held this spring.

Robert Fico’s ouster would represent a setback for Russian sharp power in central Europe and for the “Orbanization” of Slovakia — and a win for pro-European and prodemocratic forces. Moscow will undoubtedly try to tip the scales in the next elections. Whether or not the Europeanists can once again mobilize a campaign to defeat a nationalist incumbent remains to be seen.

John Chin is an assistant teaching professor of political science in the Carnegie Mellon Institute for Strategy and Technology at Carnegie Mellon University. He is the lead author of the Historical Dictionary of Modern Coups D’état (2022).

Copyright © 2025 National Endowment for Democracy

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