The pillars of Sisi’s regime are straining, and Assad’s collapse is raising the pressure. If Egypt is going to follow Syria’s path, these are signals to watch.
March 2025
Fourteen years ago, when the Jasmine Revolution forced Tunisia’s dictator, President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, to give up his 23-year grip on power and flee, many Egyptians wondered whether their country’s dictator would be next to fall. Not everyone thought he would. “Egypt is not Tunisia,” some Egyptian analysts declared. Less than a month later, however, hundreds of thousands of protesters gathered in Tahrir Square and deposed President Hosni Mubarak, who had ruled for 29 years. Since the flight of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad and the collapse of his regime, observers in Egypt are once again wondering about the fate of their own country. Conditions seem to be ripe for change. But the question remains: Will Egypt follow Syria’s path?
Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has been president of Egypt since 2014, and will hold office until at least 2030 — or later if he makes the much-expected move to amend the constitution to remove presidential term limits. Under Sisi’s reign, Egyptians have suffered unprecedented political repression far exceeding what they experienced under Mubarak. Sisi has focused on infrastructure megaprojects, which have led to a historic currency devaluation and immense economic suffering for the vast majority of Egyptians. He crushed the dreams of freedom and civic participation of the millions who took to the streets in 2011, only fueling their grievances and their desire for freedom. For good reason, then, Sisi and his regime are wary of what the recent events in Syria might mean for Egypt.
Sisi has built his legitimacy on two main pillars: his strong ties with the military as their former commander and his elimination of the Muslim Brotherhood from Egypt’s political and social life. Should one of these pillars fall, Sisi will become extremely vulnerable, as Syria’s revolution shows.
The fall of Assad sent a message to Egypt’s ruling elite: Crushing dissent would never be successful for more than a decade. The danger for Sisi of such a message is that it forces all political players, including the military, to recalculate their positions, either with or against his regime. Given that the sudden collapse of Syria’s regime would not have been possible had the army sided with Assad, the power dynamics between Sisi and his military will be key to understanding how events might unfold in Egypt. All would be wise to monitor the tensions between Sisi and his top brass for signs that they might defect, as their Syrian counterparts did.
Last July, in the latest cabinet reshuffle, Sisi fired his defense minister and the influential army chief of staff. State-sponsored news outlets had initially reported that the defense minister would stay on. But on the morning he was to be sworn in, Sisi unexpectedly replaced him with the presumptive minister of local development, who was promoted two ranks to become a lieutenant-general that very day. According to Egypt’s constitution, the Supreme Military Council is supposed to approve such appointments. But no official statement of approval was released. The dramatic moves fueled speculation about the shifting relationship between Sisi and the military top brass.
Two months after Sisi fired the military chiefs, the CEO of Egypt’s sovereign wealth fund, Ayman Soliman, resigned. Reports indicate that Soliman left his post after multiple unsuccessful attempts to incorporate military-backed companies into the stock exchange, made at Sisi’s behest to satisfy IMF conditions. This speaks to the growing divide between Sisi and the military leadership — a schism that threatens to bring down one of the main pillars of his rule.
Sisi used his second main pillar of legitimacy, the promise to eliminate the Islamist threat posed by the Muslim Brotherhood, to justify his heavy-handed suppression of opposition. The Egyptian government designated the Brotherhood a terrorist organization. As a result, scores of people, some secular, have been tried and spent years in prison for joining the group. While many Egyptians once supported this effort, they are now more concerned with the country’s mounting economic woes and repeated governance failures.
Syria’s takeover by the Islamist insurgent group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has allowed Sisi’s regime to revive its old playbook of using the Islamists as a strawman to warn against dissent. But if HTS, a designated terrorist group, succeeds in establishing an inclusive model that follows the rules of democracy and minority integration, this logic will collapse — and threaten the second pillar of Sisi’s reign.
While the whole world is hoping for HTS to set an example of moderation and peaceful inclusion of Islamists in the democratic process, the Egyptian regime wants the exact opposite. Egypt’s state-sponsored media have painted a grim image of Syria’s future, highlighted HTS’s violent past, and repeatedly aired Sisi’s speech in which he claims that Syria has already been “destroyed.” The success of the new Syrian regime could permanently undermine this story — and Sisi’s legitimacy. That does not mean, however, that Egypt will follow Syria’s path.
Since the 1952 coup against King Farouk, Egypt’s regime changes have always involved the military. Even after the January 2011 popular revolt, the Egyptian military asserted itself as guardian of the transition. Now, the Egyptian public firmly opposes violent insurrection. This became evident after an Egyptian HTS fighter, Ahmad al-Mansour, called from Damascus for an armed revolt against Sisi. Despite some support from Islamists, the overwhelming majority opposed the call and denied al-Mansour’s association with Egypt’s peaceful January revolution. Al-Mansour was then detained by Syrian security, a sign that the new regime would not be a platform for incitement. The messages, however, might still inspire regime change in Egypt — even if not through armed rebels like HTS.
Egypt has experienced two types of coups in recent history: those headed by lower-ranking military officials, such as the 1952 coup that brought Gamal Abdel Nasser to power and installed a military dictatorship that has survived in various forms to this day, and others led by higher-ranking personnel, such as the 2013 coup when Sisi assumed control after deposing Mohamed Morsi. With Sisi’s tanking popularity and the country’s widening income gap, the masses will likely side with whoever attempts to oust him.
The prominent opposition figure Yehia Hussein Abdel Hady was recently imprisoned again after receiving a presidential pardon in 2022. He was detained last July for calling on the military to not stand still and watch while the state collapsed. His story is but one example of how desperate Egyptians are to see Sisi go, and his plans to extend his presidential term beyond 2030 will only make them more anxious.
Sisi understands that the risks of spillover from Syria are high, hence his apparent hostility toward the new regime. Instead of doubling down on suppression, however, Sisi should realize that to avoid Assad’s fate, he must avoid the Syrian dictator’s inflexibility with the opposition. Sisi should implement a genuinely inclusive political process that starts with releasing all political prisoners and guaranteeing a free and fair process for the upcoming parliamentary election scheduled later this year. This political openness should be coupled with structural economic reforms and, of course, forgoing further meddling with the constitution to extend his reign.
If policy failures persist and public frustration builds, the military chiefs will likely be obliged to assert the power of the armed forces over the president to preserve their credibility and integrity. Otherwise, military leadership would risk the lower ranks taking matters into their own hands, a chaotic and unpredictable scenario that all seek to avoid.
Shady ElGhazaly Harb is a Visiting Scholar at the Middle East Initiative at the Belfer Center and a research fellow at the Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, and a prominent activist of the Egyptian revolution and Arab Spring.
Copyright © 2025 National Endowment for Democracy
Image credit: Evelyn Hockstein/POOL/AFP via Getty Images
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