Although Germans flooded the polls, the country is deeply polarized and politically fragmented. Germany’s centrists need to deliver on voters’ concerns. If they don’t, the far-right AfD is waiting in the wings.
February 2025
At first glance, the results of Germany’s snap election on Sunday seem straightforward. Friedrich Merz’s Christian Democrats (CDU) and their Bavarian sister party (CSU) won a clear mandate to form the next government. Olaf Scholz, the leader of the Social Democrats (SPD), has acknowledged his defeat and will remain in office until a new coalition is formed. His party suffered its worst result since 1887.
The two other parties tied to Germany’s previous “traffic-light” coalition did not fare much better. Robert Habeck’s Greens and the pro-business Free Democrats (FDP) both suffered an electoral beating, with the FDP failing to pass the 5 percent threshold and the Greens falling to just 11.6 percent.
Predictably, these results led to its fair share of political casualties. The leader of the FDP announced his exit from politics live on primetime television, while Green vice-chancellor Habeck declared the next day that he had no further ambitions for “leading roles in the party.” Olaf Scholz announced that he would take a backseat in the SPD and leave coalition talks to others.
So is the German center holding?
Certainly, one positive development is the increase in voter participation. With 83 percent of voters going to the polls — similar turnout was last achieved in the 1990s — this is a sure sign of democratic vitality. However, a more nuanced analysis suggests that Merz’s electoral success masks deeper and more disconcerting trends of far-reaching polarization and fragmentation.
Despite the rhetoric on election night, Merz’s victory is not what his party — or he himself — had hoped for. While 28.5 percent of the vote marks an increase of 4.4 percent, this is anything but an electoral triumph against a rump coalition habitually labeled the “worst German government of all time.” It is also the second-worst result in the CDU’s history.
The biggest winner, in some ways, was not Merz but the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), which has now firmly established itself as the country’s second-strongest party. While electoral maps show a clear divide between the former East and West of the country — with the AfD dominating the East in a sea of blue — the AfD has, in fact, made significant inroads into the West, gaining votes everywhere. Now entering the Bundestag with more than 152 members, the AfD is the official leader of the opposition. This not only gives the far-right party access to additional funds and speaker time, but it will also now have a stronger say in nominating heads of parliamentary committees.
At the other end of the spectrum, and underscoring Germany’s deepening polarization, is the surprise success story of this election: the return of the far-left Die Linke. After its popular leader Sahra Wagenknecht left the party to form her own political project (the Alliance Sahra Wagenknecht, BSW), the party polled at around 2 percent. On Sunday, it nevertheless managed a stunning comeback with 8.8 percent of the vote. Ironically, it was Merz himself who ended up throwing a lifeline to Die Linke. After the CDU leader broke a longstanding political taboo by cooperating with the AfD in a key parliamentary vote on migration just weeks before election day, a new electoral dynamic emerged. Progressive, urban, young voters — especially women — rallied behind the social-media savvy Linke as the most ideologically outspoken rejection of Merz’s stance.
Another surprise story came from the BSW. The party narrowly missed the 5 percent threshold, finishing at 4.97 percent, raising questions about its longevity.
Taking stock of the newly elected Bundestag with five political factions, it is easy to overlook the broader trend of political fragmentation. A total of five parties running nationwide missed the 5 percent threshold required by German election laws. And with roughly 21 percent support for the far right, 9 percent for the far left, and almost 5 percent for the left-wing populist BSW, Germany’s center has shrunk markedly. This trend is especially notable among younger voters between 18 and 24 years old, who favored the far left and the far right by large margins.
Yet, in the short run, the failure of the FDP and BSW to enter parliament has eased Friedrich Merz’s path to power. Given the parliamentary majorities, Merz now only needs one coalition partner — a stark contrast to the previous government’s complex three-party negotiations. Since Merz has ruled out any cooperation with the AfD, a coalition with the Social Democrats now remains the only viable option.
Clearly, appetite among the SPD’s rank-and-file members for yet another “grand coalition” is limited. And it is rank-and-file party members who will likely have to approve any coalition agreement. SPD grandees are stressing that entering coalition negotiations will “not be automatic,” but ultimately the party is likely to accept another role in government — if only to prevent a possible collaboration between Merz and the far right. Still, the problem remains that Merz has a mandate to govern to the right, which he now needs to implement with parts of the country’s left.
This need to compromise has been labeled a “centrist trap” and certainly previous grand coalitions have fallen short of implementing drastic change. But this time around, things could — and many will say will need to — be different. Merz has openly criticized the debt ceiling enshrined in the German constitution, a much-hated target of Social Democratic scorn, and a majority of SPD supporters have recently shifted positions on immigration, which Merz has promised to take a tougher stance on.
Thus a grand bargain tackling two major voter concerns seems to be on the horizon. And with polls consistently showing that economic stagnation, crumbling infrastructure, and illegal immigration were the main drivers of voter frustration, this would be significant in any attempts to tamp down support for the political extremes.
With voter realignment in full swing and the right on the rise, Germany’s political center may now only have one chance left to reverse the anti-establishment tide. In this, timing will be crucial. Merz has signaled his intent to form a government quickly — ideally before Easter. Given the difficulty of achieving constitutional change on debt in the newly elected parliament, Merz is floating the idea of using the outgoing parliament’s existing majority to amend the “debt-brake” rule before taking office or to bring about a further investment package for the country’s underfunded military.
While this would be unconventional, it underscores how seriously Merz takes the political urgency of the moment — and the threat that the country’s far right poses. Indeed, AfD leader Alice Weidel has already declared Merz a potential transitionary figure, warning that her party will be “hunting the government down” and standing ready to take over.
Michael Bröning is a political scientist and a member of the basic-value commission of the German Social Democratic Party. His most recent book is Die Hetzer sind immer die Anderen (2024).
Copyright © 2025 National Endowment for Democracy
Image credit: Volker Hartmann/AFP via Getty Images
|
FURTHER READING |
||
Is Germany Headed to a Political Crisis? |
Why Germany’s Far Right Is Winning Big |
Why Germans Are Rallying Against the Far RightHundreds of thousands of Germans are taking to the streets in protest against the country’s far-right parties. Will it shift the tide or leave Germany further divided? |