

GLOBALIZATION AND SELF-GOVERNMENT

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Two broad international trends have dominated the last quarter of the twentieth century and the initial years of the twenty-first: globalization and democratization. Although both globalization and democratization have long and complex histories, each was greatly accelerated by the collapse of Soviet communism in the revolutions of 1989–91. These two trends have been interrelated and, for the most part, mutually reinforcing. That is to say, globalization has fostered democratization, and democratization has fostered globalization. Moreover, both trends generally have furthered American interests and contributed to the strengthening of American power. Yet while the impact of globalization on democracy has been largely positive until now, this will not necessarily be the case in the future. As the new century unfolds, globalization may come to pose a threat to democracy and a set of difficult dilemmas for the United States.

Globalization is probably the most prominent social science “buzzword” of our day, having recently wrested that distinction from the term “civil society.” Having by now read literally dozens of attempts to fix a precise definition for “civil society,” I have come to the conclusion that it is impossible to establish an exact, let alone consensual, meaning for such buzzwords. They simply are used and misused by too many different authors in too many different ways. On the other hand, if we are seriously to discuss the nature and potential consequences of globalization, it will hardly suffice to apply to it U.S. Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart’s famous pronouncement about obscenity: “I know it when

I see it.” So let me try briefly to elucidate the complex of meanings, mostly complementary but sometimes contradictory, that seem to be embodied in the term “globalization.”

In the first place, as the word’s root suggests, globalization refers to processes that are worldwide in scope. In this sense, it all started with Christopher Columbus, for prior to the discovery of the New World there were no truly global developments, at least in the political, social, or economic realms. But if globalization is understood solely or primarily in this “planetary” sense, then not just the discoveries and conquests of the early modern era, but the European imperialism of the nineteenth century and the world wars of the twentieth have been among its most potent instruments. The metaphor that best captures this meaning of globalization is that we live in “a *shrinking* world,” one in which developments in any part of the world—whether for good or ill—are likely to impinge on people living elsewhere, sometimes with startling rapidity.

Of course, the shrinking of the world has given rise to global cooperation as well as global conflict. Some of today’s international organizations, such as the International Telecommunication Union and the Universal Postal Union, date back well into the nineteenth century. Today there are a multiplicity of such organizations covering almost every aspect of international life. And of course, the United Nations itself, in which virtually every country in the world is represented by an ambassador in New York, constitutes a formal recognition of the global order.

A further consequence of the shrinking of the world is that peoples everywhere tend to become more alike. This too is an old story. In the middle of the eighteenth century, Jean-Jacques Rousseau wrote:

To the extent that races are mixed and peoples confounded, one sees the gradual disappearance of those national differences which previously struck the observer at first glance. Formerly, each nation remained more closed in upon itself. There was less communication, less travel, fewer common or contrary interests, and fewer political and civil relations among peoples; there were . . . no regular or resident ambassadors; great voyages were rare; there was little far-flung commerce. . . . There is now a hundred times more contact between Europe and Asia than there formerly was between Gaul and Spain. Europe alone used to be more diverse than the whole world is today.¹

Obviously, the tendency that Rousseau described has not only continued but accelerated over the past two and a half centuries. In recent decades, in fact, especially thanks to advances in communications technology, it has advanced so swiftly that the current degree of globalization may plausibly be regarded as constituting a difference in kind.

This brings us to the more expansive understanding of globalization put forward by champions of that combination of global markets and unfettered technological advance known as “the new economy” (at least

that is what it was called during the heady days of the 1990s). This view is nicely captured in a full-page newspaper ad that was taken by the giant financial firm Merrill Lynch at the height of the international economic crisis in 1998. The ad, cited by Thomas Friedman in his colorful and deservedly popular 1999 book *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, is headlined “The World Is 10 Years Old,” and reads as follows:

It was born when the Wall fell in 1989. It’s no surprise that the world’s youngest economy—the global economy—is still finding its bearings. . . . Many world markets are only recently freed, governed for the first time by the emotions of the people rather than the fists of the state. From where we sit, none of this diminishes the promise offered a decade ago by the demise of the walled-off world. . . . The spread of free markets and democracy around the world is permitting more people everywhere to turn their aspirations into achievements. And technology, properly harnessed and liberally distributed, has the power to erase not just geographical borders but also human ones.²

Understood in this way, globalization goes beyond more frequent and more intensive contact among peoples; it is a process of integration that draws together *individuals* living in different countries. In so doing, it makes national differences not only less sharp but also less consequential. For the enthusiasts of free markets and the Internet, economics and technology trump politics. As suggested by the Merrill Lynch ad, this view of globalization holds that it is creating a world where borders matter less and less, or an increasingly *borderless* world.

It would be hard to deny that technological advances, together with the current ascendancy of free markets and democracy, now make possible a degree of global commerce and “people-to-people” contacts that would have been unthinkable in earlier eras. The key questions that remain unanswered, however, are how persistent this tendency is and how far it will go toward eroding the significance of political boundaries. A shrinking world does not necessarily lead to a borderless world. To take just one example, the international Islamist terrorism that erupted most spectacularly last September 11 certainly provided dramatic evidence of globalization in the sense of a shrinking world. Yet at the same time it underlined how much territorial boundaries still matter, and global terrorist networks surely must be regarded as a major obstacle to globalization understood in the sense of a borderless world.

The Progress of Democratization

There is also, of course, considerable controversy about the meaning of democracy, though much less today than a couple of decades ago, when some still took seriously such notions as “people’s democracy,” “one-party democracy,” or “revolutionary democracy.” Current debate among political scientists is largely between those who adopt a minimalist

definition tied solely to the holding of free elections and those who insist that a more ample degree of protection of political and civil liberties is also required. But whichever of these definitions one chooses, it is plain that the number of democracies in the world has soared since the “third wave” of democracy was launched with the Portuguese revolution of 1974.

In his now-classic 1991 book *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Samuel P. Huntington, using a minimalist definition, wrote about how the number of democracies in the world nearly doubled between 1973 and 1990, going from 30 to 58.³ Notwithstanding the endless controversy about how individual countries should be classified, there can be no denying that these numbers have risen markedly in the decade since his book appeared. According to Freedom House’s latest assessment, the number of “electoral democracies” (countries who choose their leaders through free elections) is now 121, while the number of countries rated as Free in terms of safeguarding political rights and civil liberties is 86. These gains, it is true, occurred mainly in the early part of the 1990s and have now leveled off, and many new democracies remain troubled. Yet it is striking how rare have been the cases of outright reversion to authoritarianism—Pakistan is one of the few prominent examples—and how many significant democratic advances there have been over the last few years: the fall of dictators in Indonesia and Nigeria; the ouster of rulers hostile to democracy in Slovakia, Croatia, and Serbia; and the peaceful turnover of power to opposition leaders for the first time in Korea, Taiwan, Mexico, Senegal, and Ghana.

This continuing democratic progress is partly attributable to the ideological supremacy of democracy. Amartya Sen, comparing the current global standing of democracy to a “default” setting in a computer program, states: “While democracy is not yet uniformly practiced, nor indeed universally accepted, in the general climate of world opinion democratic governance has now achieved the status of being taken to be generally right.”⁴ He notes that this represents a striking change from only a short time ago, when supporters of democracy in the developing countries were very much on the defensive. One might add that the survival even of weak and poorly functioning democracies has been greatly aided by the discrediting of military rule, one-party systems, and other authoritarian alternatives.

Over the past decade, the two doctrines that seemed to have the greatest potential for mounting an ideological challenge to liberal democracy have been Islamic fundamentalism and “Asian values.” Although the events of September 11 reaffirmed that Islamic fundamentalism is capable of mobilizing fanatical resistance to democracy, it remains doubtful that it can become the basis for powerful modern states. In fact, Islamic fundamentalism appears to represent a less immediate threat to most

Arab rulers today than it did a decade ago. And in the most important country where it has been in power, Iran, its grip is weakening. Especially striking is the extent to which many of those within the clerical regime itself, including President Mohammad Khatami, have adopted the vocabulary of “civil society,” the “rule of law,” and the rights of citizens, while the public has grown increasingly anticlerical and prodemocratic. Meanwhile, the appeal of “Asian values” has been weakened not only by the Asian financial crisis but by the fall of one of its most prominent exponents, former Indonesian dictator Suharto, and by the progress of democracy in such key Asian countries as Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. Neither of these doctrines can yet be counted out, but today they do not seem to pose a serious challenge to the ideological hegemony of democracy.

The unparalleled worldwide legitimacy of democracy can be seen in the recent evolution of international law and institutions.⁵ While democracy also enjoyed a preeminent position following the Second World War—as is reflected in the inclusion in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) of Article 21, which spells out the right of all people to take part in government through free elections—the right to free elections tended to become a dead letter with the intensification of the Cold War and then the proliferation of one-party regimes. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, however, it has been revived in all kinds of international charters, agreements, and declarations. Nor is this simply a matter of rhetoric. Support for democracy also has been embodied in the practices of numerous multilateral organizations, both global and regional. A wide variety of international bodies, as well as major Western governments, now provide “democracy assistance” in one form or another. Even the World Bank, under the label of “governance,” often imposes a kind of “democratic conditionality” on its lending. Democracy is also increasingly a criterion for diplomatic recognition and membership in the most important regional organizations. And in the case of Haiti in 1994, the United Nations even passed a resolution justifying the use of force to restore to power an elected leader who had been ousted by a coup.

On the whole, then, there is little question that thus far globalization and the spread of democracy have been mutually reinforcing. In the first place, the domination of the world by a single ideology, almost whatever its content, is likely to be more favorable to globalization than a world that is divided into ideologically opposed blocs, as was the case during the bipolar order of the Cold War era. But beyond this, there are obvious affinities between globalization and democracy. Liberal democracy clearly favors the economic arrangements that foster globalization—namely, the market economy and an open international trading system. Moreover, liberal democracy’s emphasis on the freedom of the individual and the right to information helps to promote the free flow of

communications that has powered globalization. It is no accident that the countries that are seeking significant limits on the access of their citizens to the Internet are all nondemocracies. Globalization, in turn, contributes to undermining authoritarian regimes by exposing their peoples to interaction with and information about other ways of life. It clearly gives an advantage to societies that are more open, flexible, and transparent, and thus, at least in the short run, it is favorable to democracy.

The Two Sides of Liberal Democracy

Why, then, do I suggest that over the longer run globalization and democracy may be at odds with each other? Answering this question requires that we be more precise about the nature and definition of democracy. When people speak of democracy today, they are referring not to the democracy of the ancient city but to modern liberal democracy. As a number of authors have emphasized in recent years, liberal democracy involves an uneasy marriage of two components—a liberal element that limits the scope and reach of government in the name of preserving individual freedom, and an element based on popular sovereignty that calls for majority rule, as expressed at the ballot box.⁶ (This latter element can be called democratic in the strict sense, as it invokes the etymological meaning of the term—the rule of the people.) Without the liberal element, majority rule risks descending into the tyranny of a majority that may ride roughshod over the rights of individuals and minorities. And without the majoritarian element, there is a strong risk that unaccountable rulers pursuing their own selfish interests or ideological schemes will invade the rights of the citizenry.

The liberal element of liberal democracy has little difficulty in accommodating globalization. Liberalism is based on the natural rights and the desire for property and comfortable self-preservation that are equally possessed by all human beings. As such, it is universal in its reach, just as the principles of human rights and the laws of the market are universal. Liberalism limits the state in the name of the prepolitical or suprapolitical goals of the individual. In principle, there is no reason why a liberal order could not be administered by a wise and benevolent despot. Nor is there any reason why it could not be implemented by a universal world state as well as or better than by existing nation-states. If Americans and Canadians, or Frenchmen and Germans, have the same human rights, there seems to be no *liberal* reason why they should be separated by artificial borders and have different governments implement the protection of those rights. In this sense, liberalism is a wholly cosmopolitan doctrine that is in full harmony with the trend toward globalization.

The same is not true of the democratic or self-governing component of liberal democracy, which requires that the people be the ultimate authors of the laws that they must obey. That means the people must choose

who will govern them, and that elected leaders must remain accountable to the people. This self-governing aspect of liberal democracy implies special bonds linking the members of the political community. They must be more than simply human beings bearing rights; they must be citizens who have special duties and obligations toward their fellow citizens. In practical terms, such citizenship is simply not possible on a global scale. While the idea of “world citizenship” may sound appealing in theory, it is very hard to imagine it working successfully in practice. Even apart from the vast diversity of languages, religions, and cultures that would have to be overcome to form a worldwide political community, the notion that a polity with six billion citizens could govern itself democratically seems utterly implausible.

There is something paradoxical about the way in which liberal democracies are able to combine adherence to universal principles with a powerful sense of loyalty and obligation to a particular polity. This is especially striking in the case of the United States, where the ties of citizenship are based less on common descent or nationality in the usual sense than on a fierce attachment to a constitutional order held to embody universal principles. A clue to this puzzling combination can be found in the doctrine of the social contract, as presented by the preeminent liberal political philosopher John Locke.

The basic premise of Locke’s teaching is that human beings are “by nature, all free, equal, and independent,” and therefore “no one can be . . . subjected to the political power of another, without his own consent.” Thus the only basis for legitimate government is an agreement or contract among a number of people to unite into a political community. Such an agreement requires individuals to obligate themselves to accept the determination of the majority, for if the parties to the contract sought to retain their natural liberty no community could subsist. Any number of people may choose to unite in such a community, says Locke, “because it injures not the freedom of the rest; they are left as they were in the liberty of the state of nature.” In fact, one of the chief reasons why people unite themselves into a community is to obtain “a greater security against any, that are not of it.” What this theory entails is that liberty or rights are natural and hence universal; political obligations, by contrast, are conventional and are owed only to those with whom one enters into the social contract. Accordingly, to ensure that their universal human rights are protected, people must enroll themselves in a particular political order.⁷

The Global Economy versus Self-Government

To the extent that globalization tends to efface all barriers between countries and to remove effective decision making from the national level, it threatens to weaken not only authoritarian regimes but demo-

cratic ones as well. In fact, one may say that globalization, carried to its logical conclusion, is hostile to self-government as such. A borderless world is most unlikely to be a democratic one. Thus the preservation of democracy may well require certain limits on globalization.

There are already many signs of the emerging tension between globalization and democracy. The large-scale demonstrations against the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank are, of course, one sign of this. Although the ideological agenda (or agendas) of the protesters does not enjoy wide political support, they do tap into real popular discontent over the fact that important developments and decisions seem to be increasingly beyond the influence of political leaders at the national level. To the extent that citizens, especially in smaller and less powerful countries, feel that their elected leaders have lost all power to govern the national economy or to preserve the national culture, democracy may be severely weakened. This danger cannot justify every short-sighted attempt at protectionism, but it is a very real problem. Globalization is likely to proceed whether we wish it to or not. But the form that globalization takes, and above all its relation to the autonomy of the nation-state (the home of modern liberal democracy), is a matter that is not wholly beyond our control.

The autonomy of the nation-state is potentially threatened both by the workings of global markets and by the rise of multilateral institutions. The first of these challenges takes the form of the triumph of economics over politics. The second would substitute a new set of global political institutions and allegiances for national ones. Let me say a word about each.

From the outset, modern liberal democracy has been identified with a substantial freeing up of the economic sphere. For Locke, “the great and chief end” for which men unite under government “is the preservation of their property.” And while it is true that he sometimes uses the term property in a broader sense that includes men’s “lives, liberty, and estates,” it is also true that he places greater emphasis on the “secure enjoyment” and increase of material goods than any previous political thinker.⁸ Thus at its very foundations, liberal democracy is bound up with a view that, while insisting on the indispensability of the political, in some sense puts it in the service of the economic.

Moreover, the liberal tradition has long understood commerce as an ally of liberty. This understanding is especially apparent in Montesquieu’s treatment in *The Spirit of the Laws* of England, the country that he regards as the great model of liberty. Of the English, he even says that, unlike other peoples, they “have ever made their political interests give way to those of commerce.” Moreover, in a chapter entitled “How Commerce Broke Through the Barbarism of Europe,” Montesquieu presents a fascinating account of how the development of international exchange forced medieval European rulers to limit their

depredations of their subjects. Because the Church's condemnation of commerce had effectively restricted its practice to the Jews, many of the latter became wealthy. But the Jews were "pillaged by the tyranny of princes," who taxed them exorbitantly, tortured them to extort money, and expelled them so they could seize their properties. In response to their plight, Jewish merchants invented the bill of exchange. By this means, Montesquieu contends, "commerce . . . was able to elude violence and to maintain itself everywhere, as even the richest merchant now had only invisible wealth, which could be transferred anywhere without leaving any traces."⁹ As a result, rulers had to learn to be more moderate and restrained if they did not want themselves and their countries to become impoverished.

One must acknowledge, then, that limiting the reach of government in order to allow the economic sphere to flourish is a longstanding feature of liberal thought and practice. But this in no way requires a dogmatic adherence in every case to unregulated commerce or free markets. Moreover, serious advocates of free markets, unlike some of the more overheated enthusiasts for globalization, understand the importance of political institutions for making free markets work effectively—a point that has been driven home by the checkered experience of market-oriented economic reform in the postcommunist world. There are no doubt lots of individual policy issues here in the United States where the influence of commercial interests seeking freer trade wrongly supersedes other domestic and foreign policy concerns, including national security. At the same time, commercial interests also frequently succeed in erecting protectionist trade barriers at the expense of other legitimate national interests.

On the whole, I do not believe that for the foreseeable future the increasing globalization of economic activity poses any threat to American democracy, in large part because the nation-state and the democratic accountability that it ensures are much more robust than the economic globalizers may realize. There is no question that the problem is potentially more serious for newer and poorer democracies, but successful economic growth is likely to take much of the sting out of limitations on their policy choices. And for those countries whose economies are unsuccessful, democracy is bound to be precarious in any case.

Global Institutions versus Self-Government

The rise of multilateral institutions is a natural response to a shrinking world. As cross-border contacts multiply, both in the economy and in other spheres, there is an inevitable need for institutions that can address problems that lie beyond the competence of any single state. Even for a superpower like the United States, neither isolationism nor across-the-board unilateralism is a realistic option. The serious argument is

about the nature of multilateral institutions and their powers vis-à-vis national governments.

In the years ahead, I believe that this will become an increasingly contentious issue, one that may well lead to unusual political divisions and alignments. For example, even those who have been strong proponents of policies to promote the global spread of democracy are likely to split into two camps, dividing those who wish to see a world of democratically governed nation-states from those who wish to see a democratic world community—those who are concerned with preserving the sovereignty of democratic nations from those who favor the universalization not only of markets but also of politics and law. In short, we will see a split between those committed to the democratic component of liberal democracy and those emphasizing its liberal component.

Signs of the conflict within prodemocracy ranks between “liberals” and “democrats” are perhaps most visible today with regard to the issue of punishment for human rights violations. In the case of the attempt by a Spanish judge to extradite former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet or the effort to bring Slobodan Milošević to trial before the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia in the Hague, “liberals” have generally favored international legal action against such human rights abusers, while many “democrats” in Chile and Yugoslavia, respectively (as well as some of their supporters abroad), have worried about the damaging effects that this might have on building stable democracy at home. The concerns of the “democrats” include not only considerations of national sovereignty and the possibility that widely publicized international trials might inflame internal divisions and make more difficult the process of national reconciliation, but also the fear that failure to grapple with such matters domestically would retard the needed strengthening of democratic political and judicial institutions. In the United States, of course, we have seen a somewhat similar division of opinion regarding the new International Criminal Court, as well as policies toward other international agencies and instruments that are seen as infringing on American sovereignty.

Another arena for this same conflict is the debate over the future of the European Union. Strictly speaking, of course, the European Union is a regional rather than a worldwide institution, but it is at the same time the clearest example we have today of an effort at integrating sovereign national states. As Ralf Dahrendorf put it in a recent article, “Many . . . see the institutional Europe as a step toward coping with globalization by democratic means. If we cannot have global democracy just yet, we can at least begin the journey to that goal by creating a large world region, Europe, along democratic principles.”¹⁰

The European Union has in many ways been a liberal project par excellence. Yet while it has achieved notable success in building a common market and a consensus on human rights, the European Union is

now widely acknowledged to be suffering from a “democratic deficit.”¹¹ This complaint was initially made by critics who wanted to reinforce the power of democratically elected national parliaments vis-à-vis Brussels, but it has subsequently been picked up by proponents of more thoroughgoing integration who wish to enhance the legitimacy of European institutions. What this suggests is that the European Union has arrived at an awkward in-between position: It has too much authority to be able to rest its democratic credentials solely on the internal democratic institutions of its member states, but its member states are unwilling truly to democratize the EU because they know that this would imply an irreversible loss of their own national sovereignty.

Currently, a European convention, chaired by former French president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, has been convened to address the future of the EU. Some have likened this to the Philadelphia convention of 1787 that drafted the U.S. Constitution and succeeded in uniting the 13 colonies to form a new state with its own democratic institutions. There is no reason in principle that the Europeans could not do the same, but there is every reason in practice to assume that they will not, for the countries of the old continent do not appear to be willing to subsume themselves in their new creation. As an article in *Le Figaro* reported, recently reelected French president Jacques Chirac sought, in a March 6 campaign speech, “to square the circle,” promising “to build a Europe powerful in the world while at the same time preserving the identity of the French nation.”¹² According to the report, Chirac “advocated enhanced European integration but also posed limits to it: no European superstate and no United States of Europe.” Although Chirac himself acknowledged the EU’s “deficit of democratic legitimacy” and proposed some reforms to help repair it, it is difficult to imagine how the EU could be genuinely democratized without undermining the sovereignty of its member states.

Globalization and the United States

The question of how the United States fits into the overall picture that I have sketched is a complex one. One useful way of approaching it is by distinguishing between the liberal and democratic strands in the American fabric. These two sometimes conflicting tendencies (one liberal and universalist, the other democratic and nationalist) often make the United States seem schizophrenic in its attitude toward the rest of the world. On the one hand, as a liberal, open, and exceedingly diverse society explicitly founded upon universal principles, the United States is better equipped than most other countries to adapt to and profit from globalization. With economic interests in every corner of the globe, the United States stands to benefit from developments that promote international cooperation and harmonization on an ever greater scale. Thus

it has a strong bent toward multilateralism and support for international law and regulation. On the other hand, among advanced democracies it is the United States where jealousy about national sovereignty (in the political rather than the economic or cultural realm) seems most acute, prompting it toward the unilateralism so many other nations complain of today. The democratic component of liberal democracy remains especially strong in this country, and thus some aspects of globalization run into strong opposition in the United States, opposition that is likely to grow.

Before elaborating upon this analysis, it is worth emphasizing that the international order that sustains globalization is underpinned by American military predominance. In the words of the French diplomat and author Jean-Marie Guéhenno (now Under Secretary-General of the United Nations for Peacekeeping Operations), “the apolitical world of globalization can prosper only under the aegis of a political entity, its guarantor, the United States.”¹³ As the events of September 11 underlined, there are significant forces in the world hostile to the current order, and they cannot be kept in check solely by economic superiority or other forms of “soft power.” Territory and the ability to defend it still remain ultimately decisive.

At the same time, it is now widely, and often bitterly, acknowledged that America towers over other nations not only in military strength but in economic might and in cultural influence. Observers elsewhere often attribute America’s unilateralist tendencies to its disproportionate power, and some in this country see efforts to restrain the United States through multilateral institutions as an effort by Lilliputians to tie down the American Gulliver. No doubt this way of viewing things is not wholly devoid of foundation, but there is also much that it does not explain. In particular, it would be hard to square such an explanation with U.S. behavior after the Second World War, when America also enjoyed a great preponderance of power yet devoted itself to establishing the array of multilateral bodies that constitute the institutional architecture of globalization to this day.

What is it about the United States that has enabled it to prosper in the era of globalization? In *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, Thomas Friedman suggests a thought experiment: If in 1900 a “visionary geo-architect” had been told about the coming of globalization a century hence, “what sort of country would he have designed to compete and to win in that world?” Friedman’s answer is that this visionary “would have designed something that looks an awful lot like the United States.”¹⁴ He then goes on to enumerate various aspects of America that equip it to excel in the age of globalization—including its geographical position; its diverse population and openness to immigrants; its economic dynamism and entrepreneurial spirit; its flexible, honest, and transparent legal system; its tolerance and individualism; its commitment to the free flow of in-

formation. This is generally accurate as far as it goes, but it does not seem to me to capture the full picture. For while it explains much of what has enabled America to seize the opportunities offered by globalization, it fails to explain what has enabled America to resist its dangers.

Guéhenno, in the essay quoted above, offers some interesting reflections on this question. Noting that globalization is increasingly regarded as a synonym for Americanization, he explores how Washington, despite the American people's preoccupation with domestic matters and lack of interest in foreign affairs, has "almost unwittingly" become the capital of what the rest of the world views as an empire. Guéhenno explains the envy and resentment with which the United States is viewed as follows: "What fascinates and irks at the same time is the way in which Americans can reduce politics to a clash of interests, and yet maintain the vitality of the American polity. How can one reconcile the fact of globalization, which ignores borders and destroys the old social structures that mediate between the individual and the global marketplace, with this other reality, the American nation, which seems to resist globalization better than most communities."¹⁵

Guéhenno answers his question by citing America's "institutional" patriotism, the fact that it views itself as "a community of choice, built upon a contract," which he contrasts with other nations that see their own communities as built "on more than functional choices." I think that this points us in the right direction, but that in emphasizing solely the functional or "utilitarian" character of Americans' devotion to their country Guéhenno pushes his argument too far. An East European friend of mine once remarked that Americans always think of themselves as representing what is new and changing in the world. In his view, however, the American polity is most importantly a model of tradition and stability, with the continuity of its more than 200-year-old regime, its veneration of its Founding Fathers and of its national monuments and symbols, and its civic spirit. It is America's profound attachment to its Constitution and its political traditions, I believe, that shields it against the potential threats posed by globalization.

This democratic or civic element also inevitably makes Americans jealous of their national sovereignty and unwilling to countenance any policies that would diminish the authority or reach of their Constitution. This may sometimes lead to a parochialism that fits poorly with America's outward-looking and liberal spirit and its leadership role in the world. But this is a tension that cannot be entirely resolved. What is needed, not only in America but in all liberal democracies, is to maintain a proper balance between their liberal and democratic elements. In most newer democracies, it is the liberal element that is weakest and most in need of reinforcement. In most advanced democracies, however, the situation is the reverse. And since the tendency of globalization is to favor liberalism at the expense of democracy, wise statesmen should

not neglect the task of strengthening the common bonds of citizenship that are essential to a liberal democratic order.

NOTES

1. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Emile*, Allan Bloom, trans. (New York: Basic Books, 1979), 453.

2. Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1999), xiii–xiv.

3. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 26.

4. Amartya Sen, “Democracy as a Universal Value,” *Journal of Democracy* 10 (July 1999): 5.

5. For a general account of this development, see Roland Rich, “Bringing Democracy into International Law,” *Journal of Democracy* 12 (July 2001): 20–23.

6. Larry Diamond, “Is the Third Wave Over?” *Journal of Democracy* 7 (July 1996): 20–37; Samuel P. Huntington, “After Twenty Years: The Future of the Third Wave,” *Journal of Democracy* 8 (October 1997): 3–12; Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,” *Foreign Affairs* 76 (November–December 1997): 22–43; Marc F. Plattner, “Liberalism and Democracy,” *Foreign Affairs* 77 (March–April 1998): 171–80; and Marc F. Plattner, “From Liberalism to Liberal Democracy,” *Journal of Democracy* 10 (July 1999): 121–34.

7. John Locke, *Second Treatise of Government*, C.B. Macpherson, ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1980), ch. VIII, sec. 95, p. 52.

8. *Ibid.*, ch. IX, sec. 123–24, p. 66.

9. Montesquieu, *De l’Esprit des Lois*, bk. 20, ch. 7; book 21, ch. 20 (translations mine).

10. Ralf Dahrendorf, “Can European Democracy Survive Globalization?” *The National Interest* (Fall 2001): 20.

11. This concern is echoed by Dahrendorf, who calls the EU’s decision-making process “an insult to democracy.” As he notes, “The Union has now laid down very serious tests of democratic virtue for so-called accession countries. If, however, it applied these tests to itself, the Union, the results would be dismal. It is not just a joke to say that if the EU itself applied for accession to the EU it could not be admitted because it is insufficiently democratic.” Ralf Dahrendorf, “Can European Democracy Survive Globalization?” 20.

12. Luc de Barochez, “Europe: Le candidat va plus loin que le chef de l’Etat,” *Le Figaro* (Paris), 7 March 2002.

13. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, “The Post–Cold War World: Globalization and the International System,” *Journal of Democracy* 10 (January 1999): 24.

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