

### Identification of Endgames in the *Dictator’s Endgames Dataset 1.0*

Based on the NAVCO 2.0 dataset by Chenoweth/Lewis (2013), we identified all instances of primarily non-violent mass protests between 1945 and 2006 that comprised at least 1,000 participants, were directed against the regime leader or the government (*target* variable), and demanded regime change and/or fundamental institutional change (*camp\_goals* variable). Afterwards, we deleted all instances that were not accompanied by at least medium-scale repression (*repression* variable) since we assume that the civilian security apparatus has to be employed unsuccessfully before the dictator turns to the military to crush the protests. To identify further endgames between 2007 and 2014, we applied the NAVCO definition of non-violent protest to a variety of additional secondary sources. We then merged these data with the *Autocratic Regimes Dataset* by Geddes and co-authors (2014) to include only those campaigns that took place in dictatorships. As Geddes et al.’s dataset only covers regimes until 2010, we applied their coding rules to determine whether protest campaigns after 2010 took place in autocratic regimes. The resulting dataset of potential endgames was subjected to a profound qualitative inquiry in which we coded the military’s reaction and checked whether the mass protests indeed threatened the survival of the regime and the (civilian) security apparatus failed to curtail the mass uprising. If a protest campaign covered several consecutive years, we only selected the year in which the military made its initial decision to crackdown on the protests, defect from the autocrat, or stage a coup. This qualitative in-depth review led to 40 validated endgames.

### Coding rules for independent variables

Variable	Coding
<b>Regime Type</b>	regime type according to Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz. “Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set.” <i>Perspectives on Politics</i> 12, no. 02 (2014): 313–331. Cases after January 1, 2010, were recoded according to their coding rules. Bahrain is missing in Geddes et al.’s data due to its population size. We categorize it as “monarchy.”
<b>Counter-balancing</b>	(0) The incumbent regime does not maintain a (civil) internal security organization to counterbalance and spy on the military. (1) The incumbent regime maintains at least one (civil) internal security organization to counterbalance and spy on the military.  <b>Source:</b> own inquiry based on secondary sources
<b>Ascriptive selection</b>	(0) Military recruitment is not organized along ascriptive criteria, including ethnic, religious, tribal and/or kinship ties.

- (1) Ascriptive criteria are decisive for military recruitment and promotion.

**Source:** own inquiry based on secondary sources

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**Past atrocities**

- (0) The regime leader does not regularly employ the military as an agent of internal repression. It is not responsible for gross human rights violations.
- (1) The military is or was engaged in repression of protests, deterrence of political dissent, torture, extra-judicial killings, or war crimes, etc. under the incumbent regime.

**Source:** own inquiry based on secondary sources

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**Composition of movement**

- (0) Less than three of these NAVCO campaign diversity variables (cdivers\_ideol, cdivers\_class, cdivers\_ethnicity, cdivers\_religion, cdivers\_urbrural) are coded with 1.
- (1) At least or more than three of these NAVCO campaign diversity Variables (cdivers\_ideol, cdivers\_class, cdivers\_ethnicity, cdivers\_religion, cdivers\_urbrural) are coded with 1.

**Source:** NAVCO 2.0 supplemented by own inquiry for missing years

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**Table—Conditions of Military Responses Against Nonviolent Mass Protests**

	<i>Regime Type</i>	<i>Counter-Balancing</i>	<i>Ascriptive Selection</i>	<i>Past Atrocities</i>	<i>Composition of Movement</i>
<b><i>Repression</i></b>					
Bahrain 2011	Monarchy	Yes	Yes	No	No
Burma 1988	Military	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Burma 2007	Military	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
China 1989	Party	No	No	No	No
Greece 1973	Military	No	No	Yes	No
Iran 1978	Monarchy	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Iran 2009	Party	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Libya 2011	Personalist	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mali 1991	Personalist	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Nigeria 1993	Military	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pakistan 1983	Military	No	Yes	Yes	No
Poland 1956	Party	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Poland 1970	Party	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
South Korea 1980	Military	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Syria 2011	Party	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Thailand 1973	Military	No	No	Yes	Yes
Thailand 1992	Military	No	No	No	Yes
Venezuela 1958	Military	Yes	No	No	Yes
Yemen 2011	Personalist	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b><i>Loyalty Shift</i></b>					
Albania 1990	Party	Yes	No	No	No
Argentina 1982	Military	No	No	Yes	Yes
Bangladesh 1990	Personalist	Yes	No	No	Yes
CSSR 1989	Party	Yes	No	No	Yes
GDR 1989	Party	Yes	No	No	Yes
Indonesia 1998	Party	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Kyrgyzstan 2005	Personalist	No	Yes	No	Yes
Madagascar 1991	Personalist	No	No	Yes	Yes
Malawi 1993	Personalist	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Philippines 1986	Personalist	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Romania 1989	Party	Yes	No	No	Yes
Serbia 2000	Party	Yes	No	No	Yes
South Korea 1960	Personalist	Yes	No	Yes	No
South Korea 1987	Military	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Tunisia 2011	Party	Yes	No	No	Yes
<b><i>Coups</i></b>					
Burkina Faso 2014	Personalist	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Egypt 2011	Party	Yes	No	No	Yes
Egypt 2013	Party	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Haiti 1985	Personalist	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Pakistan 1969	Military	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sudan 1985	Personalist	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes